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Abstract
The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet
Jury Theorem to formally justify the wisdom of crowds. But this theorem is
inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises voter independence
is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorems
misleading conclusion that large crowds are infallible. We prove a more useful
jury theorem: under defensible premises, large crowds are fallible but better
than small groups. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation
and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework.
The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) looks back on a remarkable career. Discovered
by Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, in 1785, rst proved formally by Laplace
in 1812 (Ben-Yashar & Paroush 2007, 190), then long forgotten and nally redis-
covered by Duncan Black (Black 1958, Grofman & Feld 1988), the CJT has now
taken centre stage in epistemic conceptions of democracy and in debates in social
epistemology. Propelled by claims in the popular literature that crowds can be wise
(Surowiecki 2004) and mobs smart(Rheingold 2002), the CJT is now again widely
discussed across various disciplines, even beyond academic circles. This career is sur-
prising for a theorem that in its basic form and applied naively rests on implausible
premises and leads to implausible conclusions, as we will show.
Roughly speaking, the CJT arrives at two conclusions concerning a group decision
between two alternatives, where one alternative is objectively correct or better. First,
the larger the group gets, the more likely is a correct majority decision. This is
the CJTs non-asymptotic conclusion. Second, the probability of a correct majority
decision converges to one as the group size tends to innity. This is the CJTs
asymptotic conclusion. Put roughly: larger groups make better decisions, and very
large groups are infallible. It is worth reecting on these results. While we think that
the non-asymptotic conclusion is plausible for many setups and can be defended, the
asymptotic conclusion is more than dubious. If the asymptotic conclusion applied
directly to modern democracies with their large populations, these democracies would
Kai Spiekermann would like to emphasize that the formal results in this paper are the work of
Franz Dietrich.
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be essentially infallible when making decisions between two alternatives by simple
majority.
What went wrong? The CJT rests on two central premises. Stated roughly, the
rst premise is that the voters vote independently from each other, and the second
premise is that each voter is competent, i.e., is more likely to vote for the correct than
the incorrect alternative (both premises will later be spelt out more carefully and
then revised). Our negative nding is the implausibility of the premises specically,
the independence premise which explains the implausible asymptotic conclusion of
infallible large groups. The non-asymptotic conclusion that larger groups perform
better, by contrast, is plausible, but is currently relying on implausible premises and
therefore left hanging without support. Our negative nding can be summed up in a
table:
Plausible?
Condorcets premises No
The asymptotic conclusion No
The non-asymptotic conclusion Yes
Our positive nding consists in a revision of Condorcets premises. The new, more
plausible premises lead to the new, plausible asymptotic conclusion that large groups
are fallible. They also o¤er a justication for the old non-asymptotic conclusion,
which previously rested on implausible premises. This will put us in a new position:
Plausible?
The new premises Yes
The new asymptotic conclusion Yes
The non-asymptotic conclusion (unchanged) Yes
In fact, the CJT rests on yet another assumption, which is implicit in the classical
framework: people vote sincerely. This implicit premise is no less problematic than
the explicit premises. It was uncovered in the 1990ies and is being addressed in an
ongoing literature. While much progress has already been achieved along this dimen-
sion of strategic voting, the problems underlying the explicit premises specically,
the premise of independent voting have not yet been understood in a systematic and
foundational way. Most believe that somethingis wrong with Condorcets premises,
but confusion prevails over how to conceptualize and solve the problem. Addressing
this is important also because the new literature on strategic voting and the CJT,
despite the progress over the classical CJT literature along the strategic voting di-
mension, still rests on the problematic independence premise (applied now to voters
private information rather than their votes). Since the strategic voting aspect is or-
thogonal to the problems related to Condorcets explicit premises, it is not addressed
in the present analysis, though a few more remarks on strategic voting will follow
below.
This introduction is followed by six sections. Section 1 begins by laying out the
classical CJT as it is often cited and applied in the contemporary literature. In
section 2 we show that the classical independence assumption cannot be justied and
will typically be false, and propose a new, improved independence assumption. The
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revision of the independence assumption requires using a new competence assumption,
which is provided in section 3. Section 4 contains our core positive result, a new jury
theorem based on the new independence and competence assumptions. We point out
that the classical CJT is nothing but a special case of our new theorem. In section 5 we
highlight two important implications of the new theorem for the theory of epistemic
democracy: deliberation and education may be crucial for the epistemic performance
of groups, whereas the classical CJT suggests that they are inessential since crowds
are infallible even without them or even dangerous since deliberation threatens
voter independence. Section 6 draws conclusions.
1 Condorcets Jury Theorem Recapitulated
We begin by stating and explaining the classical CJT before criticizing its assumptions
in the next sections. The rst statement can be found in Condorcet (1785), a trans-
lation of most parts in Sommerlad and McLean (1989). The theorem has been stated
in many variants; an inuential one is provided by Grofman et al. (1983). Among the
most important applications in political philosophy are Grofman and Felds (1988)
use of the CJT to interpret Rousseaus general will(cf. Estlund et al. 1989) and,
of course, the link between the CJT and epistemic conceptions of democracy (Cohen
1986, Gaus 1997, List and Goodin 2001, Estlund 2008). A link between the CJT,
judgement aggregation and social epistemology is o¤ered by Bovens and Rabinow-
icz (2006) and List (2005). Several important generalizations of the classical CJT
have been proposed. For instance, Owen et al. (1989) prove that the asymptotic
part also holds if judges are heterogeneous in competence, and Atkinson & Romeijn
(forthcoming) analyse cases of unknown competence. Most relevant for our purposes
are contributions that discuss the problematic assumption of independence. Quite a
few papers recognize that independence is di¢ cult to meet (for instance Nitzan and
Paroush 1984, Shapley and Grofman 1984, Boland 1989, Boland et al. 1989, Berg
1993, Estlund 1994, Spiekermann and Goodin 2010, Kaniovski forthcoming). Among
the most systematic treatments of independence violations is the work of Krishna
Ladha (1992, 1993, 1995), who shows that shared information typically leads to cor-
related votes and o¤ers jury theorems for correlated votes. Unlike this literature, we
shall develop a causal, network-theoretic account of voter dependence. It is inspired
by, but signicantly goes beyond Dietrich and List (2004) and Dietrich (2008), who
also employ causal network reasoning but only focus on special cases of independence
violations.
We now give a precise rendering of the classical CJT. Let there be a group of
individuals, labelled i = 1; 2; 3; ::: The size of the group (electorate) is any number n,
which we assume to be odd to avoid ties under majority voting. The group has to
decide between two alternatives, labelled 0 and 1. Exactly one of these alternatives
is correct, rightor better.1 We will use the attribute correctfrom now on. The
correct alternative is called the state (of the world) and is typically denoted x. The
1Many di¤erent notions of objectivity are compatible with that assumption, as long as the right,
correct or better answer is a fact that is determined entirely independently from the votes of the
individuals. This excludes procedural notions of rightness, where the right solution is right just
because it was arrived at by applying the appropriate procedure.
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state is generated by a random variable x, taking the values 0 and 1, each with positive
probability. Each person votes for one alternative, abstentions are not allowed. For
each voter i we consider an event Ri, the event that voter i votes correctly. (Some
authors take the votes rather than the correct voting events Ri as primitives of the
model. This makes no di¤erence since the votes and the correct voting events are
interdenable given the state x.2) We write Mn for the event that a majority of an
n-member electorate votes correctly.3
Classical Independence. Informally, the correct voting events are independent
given the state. Formally, R1; R2; ::: are independent conditional on x.
Classical Competence. Informally, the probability of correct voting given any state
exceeds 12 and is the same across voters. Formally, for each state x 2 f0; 1g, Pr(Rijx)
exceeds 12 and does not depend on i (but possibly on x).
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Condorcet Jury Theorem. Suppose Classical Independence and Classical Com-
petence. As the group size increases, the probability Pr(Mn) that a majority votes
correctly (i) increases, and (ii) converges to one.
We now explain the two conditions and the theorem in turn. Events are (con-
ditionally) independent if learning that some of them occurred does not change the
(conditional) probability that others occurred.5 In our case, the probability that
some voters vote correctly (conditional on a state) is not inuenced by learning that
some other voters vote correctly. An analogy with coin tossing might help. Suppose
a coin is tossed independently many times, one toss for each voter. Headsmeans
voting for alternative 1, tailsmeans voting for 0. The coin is not just any coin
but a predictor coin whose shape is inuenced by the state of the world: it is biased
towards the correct outcome, in analogy to Classical Competence. The tosses (votes)
are not independent unconditionally, since from the outcome of some of the tosses we
learn something about the coin shape, and hence about the other tosses. However,
in analogy to Classical Independence the tosses are independent conditional on the
state, since once we know the state, we know the shape of the coin, so that tosses do
not tell us anything new about the coin shape and hence about other tosses.
With the two premises in place, we can turn to the theorem itself. The CJT is
nothing but an application of the law of large numbers. In terms of our example,
if the predictor coin is thrown very often, it becomes exceedingly likely that the
majority of results will be correct, and this probability converges to 1 as the number
2From Ri one can dene is vote as the random variable vi in f0; 1g which matches the state x in
the event Ri and di¤ers from x otherwise. Conversely, if one were to start from vi one could dene
Ri as the event that vi = x.
3The event Mn can be written as [If1;:::;ng:#I>n=2 \i2I Ri, because Mn means that there is
some set of individuals I  f1; :::; ng with more than n=2 members such that all individuals i in I
vote correctly, i.e., such that \i2IRi obtains.
4All probabilistic statements refer to a probability measure Pr (dened over some underlying
algebra of events).
5Formally, events are independent if for any (nite) number of them the probability that they occur
jointly equals the product of their probabilities. Conditional independence is dened analogously,
with probabilities replaced by conditional probabilities.
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of tosses tends to innity.6 Large groups are essentially infallible, even if its members
are only slightly competent (Goodin and Spiekermann 2010). For instance, with
competence only p = 0:51, a group of 100,000 voters which is still small for a modern
democracy would be correct in majority with a probability of about 0.99999999987.
This prediction of infallibility for dichotomous factual choices does not withstand
empirical scrutiny and will be revised in due course.
Importantly, this framework does not distinguish between someones vote and his
sincere judgment. These two can come apart, since the sincere voting prole may not
form a Nash equilibrium (in a suitably dened n-player Bayesian game with private
information). This fact was long overlooked, presumably because it was taken for
granted that strategic voting could not arise when all voters share the same preference
for correct collective decisions; it was brought to light in seminal work by Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000), and
many others. As much as the literatures current concern for strategic-voting-related
shortcomings of the classical model is justied, it might have distracted the attention
from the shortcomings of Condorcets explicit premises, notably Classical Independ-
ence. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, the strategic-voting literature on the
CJT takes independence of private information for granted, while becoming more and
more sophisticated on other dimensions. The current paper returns to the origins by
analysing and revising Condorcets two explicit premises. Pursuing two goals at once
is never a good idea, and therefore we do not address strategic voting here. But
how is one to read our paper in light of the modern insights about strategic voting?
Either, one simply assumes that peoples votes match their sincere judgments.7 Or,
if one feels uncomfortable with this assumption, one may reinterpret Ri as the event
that voter is private pre-strategic judgment is correct (whether or not it matches is
vote), and Mn as the event that a majority holds the correct private judgment. Un-
der the latter interpretation, this paper is not about voting but about private opinion
formation and the majority opinion; and the insights gained here about private opin-
ion formation would have to be combined with the modern insights about strategic
voting in order to form a complete analysis of epistemic aggregation.
2 Common Causes and the Failure of the Classical In-
dependence Assumption
In this section we show that Classical Independence typically does not hold in real-
world decision problems and needs to be revised. Our critique of Classical Independ-
6Throughout, the term increasingis to be understood as weakly increasing; that is, later values
are at least as large as (but not necessarily larger than) earlier values.
7Under some specications of the votersutilities, this typically implies that at least some voters
vote irrationally. These specications make a voters utility depend only on the pair of the state
and the outcome (majority vote), where utility is high when the outcome matches the state and low
otherwise. However, as is often overlooked, voting sincerely is typically rational as soon as voters also
care at least slightly about whether their own vote is sincere (for when maximising expected utility
the sincerity concern outweighs the outcome-oriented concern since the probability of pivotality is
typically very small). Here, the sincere voting assumption of the classical CJT is compatible with
game-theoretic rationality.
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ence does not take the common line of pointing out that voters can inuence each
other; rather we show that Classical Independence is questionable even in the absence
of any such causal inuences between voters. We start by developing an example that
we shall use repeatedly in due course. This will be followed by our core argument
against Classical Independence: the observation that voters are typically inuenced
by common causes and therefore not independent in the classical sense. Our New
Independence assumption responds to this problem.
Imagine a government relying on a group of economic advisors. Towards the end
of 2007, when the US housing market starts dropping, the government wants to know
whether a recession is imminent. It asks all advisors and adopts the majority view. To
ensure that the experts do not inuence each other, safeguards are in place to prevent
any communication between them. If the classical CJT applied, we could conclude
that the probability of a correct majority vote converges to 1 as more and more
advisors are consulted. But this conclusion is unlikely to be true because Classical
Independence is typically violated even though the experts do not communicate. To
see this, consider a few examples. First, if all economists rely on the same publicly
available evidence, then this evidence will usually cause them to vote in the same
way. For instance, if all the evidence misleadingly suggests healthy growth (with the
evidence indicating, say, that banks have much healthier balance sheets than they
actually have) while a bank crash is already around the corner, then most reasonable
economists will be wrong in their prediction. The votes are then dependent through
consulting the same evidence. More precisely, given for instance that alternative 1
is correct, incorrect votes for 0 by some voters raise the probability of misleading
evidence, which in turn raises the probability that other voters also vote incorrectly,
a violation of independence. Second, if all economists rely on the same theoretical
assumptions for the interpretation of the evidence (such as low correlations between
market prices of certain credit default swaps), this common inuence is likely to
induce dependence between the votes. In the extreme, either all get it right or all get
it wrong. Finally, if the experts are more likely to make wrong predictions in weather
that gives headaches, then weather creates dependence between votes. Again, in the
extreme either all get it right or all get it wrong (and have headaches).
In all these examples, the economic experts are not classically independent and
therefore the classical CJT cannot be applied. At the same time, the experts are
independent in a di¤erent sense. They are independent if we hold all the common
causes xed, or, in di¤erent words, if we conditionalize on all the common causes
that inuence them. Given the economistss particular common evidence, their com-
mon background theories, the commonly experienced weather, and all other common
causes, their judgements are independent.
We now introduce our new conception of independence more systematically, draw-
ing on the well-established theory of causal networks. The classical independence of
votes can be undermined when a common cause inuences all voters. This follows from
Reichenbachs inuential common cause principle, which is usually understood thus:
a more frequent than expected coincidence between a set of phenomena, which do
not a¤ect each other, is due to (possibly hidden) common causes, and the phenomena
become independent once we conditionalize on these common causes (Reichenbach
1956, 159-60). Slightly more precisely:
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Common Cause Principle (CCP). Phenomena which do not causally a¤ect each
other are probabilistically independent conditional on their common causes, but usu-
ally dependent unconditionally in the presence of common causes.8
One can represent common causes graphically, as in gure 1a. Figure 1a is a very
simple causal network, depicting the causal relations between a set of variables. A
node signies a phenomenon, mathematically represented as a random variable. An
arrow signies a causal inuence in the direction of the arrow.9 For simplicity, this
and all other gures show only the rst two votes, labelled v1 and v2. Both votes are
causally inuenced by a common cause c (common causes are shown as grey nodes
in all gures). If, for instance, the problem is to judge whether a defendant is guilty,
then the common cause c in gure 1a could be a commonly observed witness report,
nger print, or other shared evidence; in all these examples, c is causally inuenced
by the fact x of whether the defendant is guilty, as represented by the arrow pointing
from x towards c.10 The e¤ect of c on votes is indicated by the arrows from c towards
each vote. Note that there are no arrows between any votes, indicating that the votes
do not have a causal inuence on each other. But even though the votes are causally
independent, they are not probabilistically independent due to the common cause c.
Figure 1: Two simple causal networks with common causes.
Compare gure 1a with 1b. In 1b, the two votes v1 and v2 are still inuenced
by the common cause, but now the direction of causality between common cause and
state is swapped so that c is a¤ecting x. To make this plausible, consider an example.
Suppose the task for the voters is to decide whether the streets are wet in Windsor,
but all voters are placed in central London. Further suppose that the voters follow a
simple heuristic: they predict that the streets are wet in Windsor if and only if the
weather is bad in London. In that case, c could be seen as the weather pattern over
8Usually, the common cause principle is stated for only two phenomena. We state it here for an
arbitrary number of phenomena such as many votes. The CCP is developed more formally in the
theory of Bayesian networks (e.g., Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, and Pearl 2000.
9We are not going to discuss causal and Bayesian networks in detail here. For a thorough intro-
duction see Pearl 2000, ch. 1. Formally, a causal network is a so-called directed acyclic graph, which
consists of a set of nodes (carrying random variables) and a set of directed arrows between distinct
nodes (representing causal relevance between variables) such that there is no directed cycle of arrows.
10While votes are dichotomous random variables, taking only the values 0 or 1, a cause such as c
need not be dichotomous. For instance, shared evidence can take more than two forms.
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southeast England, inuencing both the votes and the state. So, in this network the
common cause c (the weather) inuences the state x (dry or wet streets in Windsor),
and not the other way round, unlike in gure 1a.
Let us consider a more complicated example. In gure 2 we include a number of
Figure 2: A causal network with private and common causes.
causes from c1 to c3. We can now distinguish between private and common causes.
In this causal network, the cause c2 a¤ects both votes and hence is a common cause.
c1 and c3, by contrast, are private causes because they only a¤ect one vote each. By
denition, common causes are nodes that have directed paths of arrows to more than
one vote node. This is why x is also a common cause (and is therefore displayed in
grey): it has paths running to v1 (through c1 or c2) and to v2 (through c2 or c3).
Figure 3: A causal network with private and common causes, some of which are
non-evidential.
Figure 3 shows another, slightly more complicated, causal network. As before, we
have common causes (c3, c4 and x) and private causes (c1; c2; c5 and c6). But in
contrast to the previous gures, we can now distinguish between non-evidential causes
that are not related to the state (c2; c4 and c6) and evidential causes that are. Non-
evidential causes are factors that inuence voters causally but do not provide them
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with evidence as to the correct alternative. These could be common non-evidential
causes (such as the weather inuencing all our economic advisors in the example
above) or private non-evidential causes (such as a domestic argument inuencing the
judgment of one advisor).
In all gures shown so far the votes v1 and v2 are not state-conditionally inde-
pendent because of common causes (other than x). That votes have such common
causes is not in any way unusual. To assume that there are none, as the classical
CJT does, is to assume a highly construed, articial decision problem that is unlikely
to occur in real-life settings. Thus, Classical Independence is typically violated. This
means that the conclusions of the CJT rest on a (typically) false premise. The upshot
is that the independence assumption must be revised.
We now introduce a more defensible independence assumption. The CCP implies
that events are independent conditional on all their common causes. So independ-
ence of votes can be achieved if we conditionalize in the right way. The classical
CJT conditionalized on x only. But to catch all the common causes, both evidential
and non-evidential, we propose to conditionalize on the decision problem at hand.
The decision problem is a description of all relevant features of the task the group
faces. The problem captures not only the state of the world but also all relevant
circumstances, which we interpret as all common causes of the votes, thus excluding
purely individual factors. We therefore conditionalize on the state of the world and
all common causes, as indicated by the dashed rectangles in gures 13. Both com-
ponents of a decision problem are indispensable. Dening the problem without the
circumstances does not work, as we have seen. Dening it without the state x is not
plausible either, since this would leave the correct answer indeterminate. Often, x is
itself a common cause anyhow, as in gures 1a, 2 and 3 but not in gure 1b.
We now return to the formal model, leaving the motivational discussion based
on causal networks behind. As far as model ingredients are concerned, only one
amendment of the classical model is needed. We keep the correct voting events
R1; R2; ::: but dispose of the state variable x in favour of a new random variable ,
the problem, whose realisations are the various possible problems  that the group
might face.11 Interpretationally, the problem captures not just the state of the world
but also the circumstances (common causes) the voters face.
We are now ready to state our revised independence premise.
New Independence. The events R1; R2; ::: that voters 1; 2; ::: vote correctly are
independent conditional on the problem .12
This assumption is far more defensible than the classical one; by conditionalizing
on the problem, we x all those circumstances which, if left variable, could lead to
voter correlation. In gure 3, for instance, by conditionalizing on the problem one
conditionalizes on all the common causes, both evidential (like c3 in gure 3) and
11Problems can (and will in real life) be highly complex objects. Our model accounts for such
complexity without loss of parsimony.
12 Independence conditional on the random variable  means that for any value which  may take
(with positive probability) there is independence conditional on  taking this value. This denition
assumes that  is discrete, i.e., takes only countably many values. For the general denition of
independence conditional on an arbitrary random variable we refer the reader to standard textbooks.
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non-evidential (like c4 in gure 3), so that the two events become probabilistically
independent. In the terminology of causal networks, the common causes screen
o¤the votes from each other, so that conditionalizing on these causes removes any
correlations between votes.
For the interested reader, appendix A briey sketches the more formal network-
theoretic foundation of New Independence; there, the network-theoretic motivation
given above is turned into a theorem.
3 The Need to Revise the Competence Assumption
The Classical Competence assumption is not unreasonable; in fact it is plausibly true.
It tells us that the voters are more likely to vote correctly than incorrectly. But when
combined with our New Independence assumption (rather than with the unrealistic
classical one) it doesnt imply that large groups are better than small ones in their
majority judgments.
Consider our group of economic advisors again. It is plausible to assume that each
economist is on average better than random in answering economic yes/no questions
such as whether a recession is imminent. However, we also know that economists are
often not competent when considering one single problem, because some problems
are more di¢ cult than others. For instance, very few economists correctly predicted
that the initially quite limited banking crisis of 2008 would trigger a major recession
in 2009. With hindsight we have learned that predicting this crisis was a di¢ cult
problem because economists faced misleading data and worked with questionable or
incorrect assumptions. In many other settings, predicting a recession is easy (or
at least easier) and economists are more likely to be correct in their predictions.
Economists can be competent on average, as demanded by the Classical Competence
assumption, without being competent on a di¢ cult problem.
Classical Competence may hold, but since our New Independence assumption
conditionalizes on the problem, we will need a problem-specic notion of competence.
To show this need we give a stylized example in which large groups are much worse
than small ones, despite classical voter competence. This demonstrates that the
conclusions of the classical CJT may fail if Classical Independence is replaced with
New Independence while retaining Classical Competence. Suppose there are only
two types of problems, easyand di¢ cultones, where each type is equally likely to
occur. Each voter i is correct on any easy problem with probability 0.99, and on any
di¢ cult one with probability 0.49. That is,
Pr(Rij) =

0.99 for every easy problem 
0.49 for every di¢ cult problem .
First note that each voter i is competent in the sense that he votes correctly with
probability Pr(Ri) = 12  0:99+ 12  0:49 = 0:74. Also the two state-conditional com-
petence parameters, Pr(Rijx = 1) and Pr(Rijx = 0), exceed 12 under mild additional
conditions (essentially, there shouldnt be a too high correlation between problem
type and state). So, Classical Competence holds. Despite the votershigh compet-
ence, the majoritys competence in a large group is low and well below individual
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competence. Indeed, the probability that the majority is correct is
Pr(Mn) =
1
2
 Pr(Mnj is easy) + 1
2
 Pr(Mnj is di¢ cult),
where the term Pr(Mnj is easy) is roughly one, but the term Pr(Mnj is di¢ cult)
is roughly 12 if n is small (because voters are only slightly worse than fair coins) but
tends to zero as n tends to innite;13 so,
Pr(Mn) 

1
2  1 + 12  12 = 34 for small n
1
2  1 + 12  0 = 12 for large n.
Large groups are worse here than small groups or single individuals! In terms of our
example, asking just one economist would be better than asking many because the
majority of the many is increasingly likely to get the di¢ cult problem wrong.
We thus need a new notion of competence: one that is relative to the decision
problem. Let us dene a voter is (problem-specic) competence as pi = Pr(Rij),
the probability that i votes correctly conditional on the problem. Its value depends
on the problem; intuitively, it is high for easyproblems and low for di¢ cult ones. In
the last example, problem-specic competence is 0.99 or 0.49, depending on whether
the problem is easy or di¢ cult. The value taken for a particular problem  a
particular realisation of  is called the competence on , denoted pi = Pr(Rij).
Figure 4 gives an example of how the distribution of a voter is problem-specic
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Pr
Figure 4: A discrete distribution of problem-specic competence.
competence could look like. There is a 10% probability of facing a problem on which
competence is as high as 1 (i.e., the voter is always right), a 20% probability of
facing a problem on which competence is 0.8, and so on for the competence levels of
0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and 0. While in gure 4 problem-specic competence follows a discrete
distribution (with six possible values), gure 5 shows an example in which problem-
13 It tends to zero because, given a di¢ cult problem, the proportion of correct votes tends to 0:49
by the law of large numbers.
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Figure 5: A continuous distribution of problem-specic competence.
specic competence follows a continuous distribution given by a density function
over the interval [0; 1]. Of course, many other discrete or continuous distributions of
problem-specic competence are imaginable.
Notice that in gures 4 and 5 the distribution of a voters problem-specic com-
petence on the interval [0; 1] is skewedto the right, so that, informally, he is more
likely to face an easyproblem (on which competence is high) than a di¢ cultprob-
lem (on which competence is low). In short, the voter nds more problems easy than
di¢ cult. Clearly, this is a notion of voter competence, but a somewhat di¤erent one
than that required by Classical Competence. This new sense of voter competence is
what our New Competence assumption formally requires:
New Competence. Problem-specic competence pi is more likely to be high than
low that is, is 12+ with at least as much probability as it is
1
2 , for all  > 0 and
is the same for all voters i that is, pi  p.14
To paraphrase this condition once more, the problem is more likely to be of the sort
on which voters are competent than of the sort on which they are incompetent (where
voters are homogeneous in competence, as in the classical setup). Problem-specic
competence thus follows a right-skewed distribution on the unit interval [0; 1] in the
sense that competence levels above 12 are at least as likely than their symmetrically
opposed levels below 12 . This clearly holds for gures 4 and 5,
15 and of course for
many other plausible (discrete or continuous) distributions on the interval [0; 1].
14The clause that is, is 1
2
+ ... for all  > 0is stated for the case that problem-specic competence
has a discrete distribution (as in gure 4 but not as in gure 5). The general statement, valid for
any sort of distribution, reads as follows: that is, belongs to

1
2
+ ; 1
2
+ 0

with at least as much
probability as it belongs to

1
2
  0; 1
2
  , for all 0   > 0. This general condition reduces to
the condition in the main text in the discrete case. It reduces to another simple condition in the
continuous case with a continuous density function, namely the condition that this density be at least
as high at 1
2
+  as at 1
2
   for all  > 0.
15Regarding gure 4, check that Pr(p = 1) = 0:1  0:05 = Pr(p = 0), Pr(p = 0:8) = 0:2 
0:1 = Pr(p = 0:2), Pr(p = 0:6) = 0:35  0:2 = Pr(p = 0:4), and Pr  p = 1
2
+ 

= 0  0 =
Pr
 
p = 1
2
   for all  > 0 such that  6= 0:1; 0:3; 0:5. Regarding gure 5, check that the condition
12
The New Competence assumption formalizes an idea stated informally at the
beginning of the section in terms of our economist example. The economists face
easy and di¢ cult problems. Some problems are very hard, for example predicting
the global recession of 2009, but fortunately not all problems are like that. If the
economists are good economists they nd most problems easy and fewer problems
di¢ cult. Unlike the Classical Competence assumption, our new assumption makes
no explicit statement about the economistsaverage competence across all problems,
or across all problems for which a given state x in f0; 1g obtains. Instead, we assume
that the economists more often have high than low competence.
As expected, our competence assumption fails for the paradoxical scenario dis-
cussed earlier in this section, since there a voters problem-specic competence is less
likely to be 0:51 than 0:49, since Pr(p = 0:51) = 0 and Pr(p = 0:49) = 12 .
16 The
violation of New Competence is the deeper reason for our counterintuitive nding
that large groups are worse than single individuals.
4 The New Jury Theorem
The New Jury Theorem is based on the New Independence and Competence assump-
tions. To introduce it, consider again our panel of economic advisors having to predict
whether there will be a recession. We assume (from New Independence) that given
any problem the events of correct predictions are independent across voters. We also
assume (from New Competence) that the prediction problem is more likely to be easy
than di¢ cult. The New Jury Theorem states that increasing the group size will in-
crease the probability of a correct majority, sampled across prediction problems. This
is the old non-asymptotic conclusion of the CJT, but based on new premises. The
New Jury Theorem also states that for very large groups the collective competence no
longer approaches one (revising the old, unrealistic asymptotic conclusion). Rather,
the asymptotic value now depends on the proportion of easy problems.
More precisely, the new theorem goes as follows:
New Jury Theorem. Suppose New Independence and New Competence. As the
group size increases, the probability that a majority votes correctly (i) increases,
and (ii) converges to a value which is less than one if Pr
 
p > 12
 6= 1 (and one if
Pr
 
p > 12

= 1).
Remark : As the proof shows, the value to which the probability of a correct majority
converges is
Pr

p >
1
2

+
1
2
Pr

p =
1
2

;
of footnote 14 is satised, since the plotted density is at least as high at 1
2
+  as at 1
2
   for all  > 0.
16Note that the support of the competence distribution namely, the set f:49; :99g seems arti-
cial in that it is very small and not symmetric around the middle 1
2
. In modelling practice, most
distributions on [0; 1] are symmetric, as they are either continuous and supported by the full interval
[0; 1] (as in gure 5) or discrete and supported by a regular grid of the form f k
m
: k = 0; :::;mg
for a positive integer m (as in gure 4, where m = 5). As long as the competence distribution has
symmetric support, this distribution is plausibly compatible with our New Competence assumption.
By denition, the support of a distribution on [0; 1] is the minimal topologically closed set S  [0; 1]
of probability one, and S is symmetric (around 1
2
) just in case 1
2
+  2 S , 1
2
   2 S for all  > 0.
13
the probability that the problem is easy plus half of the probability that the problem
is on the boundary between easy and di¢ cult.
While proving the non-asymptotic conclusion is not straightforward (see appendix
B), it is easy to develop an intuition of what is driving the asymptotic conclusion
and the remark. We know that voters (our economic advisors, for instance) have
a probability greater than 12 to vote correctly on easy problems, smaller than
1
2 on
di¢ cult problems, and equal to 12 on boundary problems. So, by the law of large
numbers, in the limit the majority will be correct on easy problems, wrong on di¢ cult
problems, and correct with probability 12 on boundary problems. Hence, the limiting
probability of the majority being correct, averaged over all problems, is as specied in
the remark. For example, if our economic advisors face easy problems 80%, di¢ cult
problems 20%, and boundary problems 0% of the time, then increasing the group of
advisors will let their collective competence converge to 0.8.
The mathematical power and generality of the theorem is that it holds regardless
of how we specify the problem variable . Indeed, although we have suggested a
specic interpretation of  it captures common causes we are mathematically free
in how we specify it. Let us illustrate this exibility by considering two very simple
specications, which depart from our suggested interpretation by not capturing the
common causes. These naivespecications allow us to recover (in fact, strengthen)
the classical CJT in two variants. For under these specications our premises and
conclusions reduce to the classical ones.
First, suppose  takes only two values, 0 and 1, representing the state of the world.
So  plays precisely the same role as the state in the classical CJT; we accordingly
write x for . To show that we obtain the Classical CJT, note that Classical Inde-
pendence implies (in fact, is directly equivalent to) New Independence, and Classical
Competence implies New Competence, so that our theorem tells us that the probab-
ility of a correct majority vote is increasing in group size and (by Pr
 
px > 12

= 1)
converges to one, just as in the Classical CJT. In fact, this strengthens the Classical
CJT since New Competence is a weaker premise than Classical Competence.17
Second, assume even more simply that  takes only one value there is just a
single problem. Conditionalizing on this xed problem is as much as not condition-
alizing at all. Therefore, our two premises take a particularly simple form:
 the events R1; R2; ::: are (unconditionally) independent, and
 competence the unconditional probability Pr(Ri) is at least 12 and the same
across voters.
As for our theorems conclusions, they are here the classical ones: majority com-
petence is increasing in group size and converges to one (unless competence is exactly
1
2).
17Because under New Competence a voters problem-specic (state-specic) competence px need
not always exceed 1
2
as long as it is more likely to be high than low in an appropriate sense. For
instance, it could be that p1 = 0:6 and p0 = 0:4, where x is more likely 1 than 0.
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5 Epistemic Democracy: Deliberation and Education
Our ndings have implications for theories of epistemic democracy. This section de-
velops two issues. First, our framework brings to light the benets of deliberation
by removing the worry that independence could be undermined once our new in-
dependence notion is adopted. Second, the framework rehabilitates the importance
of individual competence for group performance, and hence of education and other
competence-boosting policy measures.
Normatively attractive conceptions of democracy involve interactions of voters be-
fore the vote. Indeed, many democratic theorists emphasize the importance of delib-
eration for democratic legitimacy or the quality of democratic outputs. The problem
is that such interactions may undermine independence when construed classically, as
many have stressed. Nonetheless, confusion prevails over how deliberation creates
dependence, and what this implies for jury theorems. Adrian Vermeule describes the
challenge well:
What is unclear is whether, and to what extent, independence is com-
promised by deliberation, discussion, or even common social background
or professional training. [...] Absent any general account of this, the ba-
sic reach of the Jury Theorem is not well understood and no amount of
possibility theorems or anecdotes about wise crowds will tell us whether
the Theorem is an important tool of political and legal theory or a minor
curiosity.(Vermeule 2009, 67, reference and footnote omitted)
Our analysis responds to this challenge by o¤ering the required general account
in terms of causal networks and by revising the independence notion so as to condi-
tionalize on all common causes, including deliberation. A somewhat di¤erent response
would be to stick to Classical Independence and try to enforce it by preventing all de-
liberation, as discussed by Grofman and Feld (1988) in their seminal work connecting
the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Rousseaus general will. Many nd this approach
normatively unacceptable. Aside from the normative worry, preventing deliberation
is only sensible if it is true that deliberation creates dependence. But is it? Jeremy
Waldron is guardedly optimistic that it is not:
The sort of interaction between voters that would compromise inde-
pendence would be interaction in which voter X decided in favour of a
given option just because voter Y did. [. . . ] But Xs being persuaded by
Y in argument or holding itself open to such persuasion does not in itself
involve Xs deciding to vote one way rather than another because of the
way Y is voting.(Waldron in Estlund et al. 1989, 1327)
Waldron here identies the paradigmatic case of dependence: one voter following
another blindly. Spelled out in our causal-network-theoretic terms, Waldrons point
is that persuasion and deliberation by themselves do not undermine independence
because they do not constitute causal e¤ects (arrows) between votes but causal e¤ects
(arrows) from earlier phenomena c such as speech acts to votes. Thus restated,
it becomes clear that Waldrons argument is in fact a defense of New rather than
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Classical Independence, since persuasive speech acts will, like other common causes
of votes, threaten Classical but not New Independence. Indeed, persuasion counts
among the more subtle threats to Classical Independence, working through common
causation rather than inter-causation of votes, as illustrated in many of our gures
above. Persuasion and deliberation could, for instance, mean that the voters align
their theories or the set of evidence they use, thereby introducing powerful common
causes that undermine Classical Independence.
David Estlund points out that Classical Independence can sometimes be met even
when there are common causes or inter-causation of votes (Estlund 2008, 225). He
refers to causal setups where the di¤erent e¤ects cancel each other out such that
probabilistic independence obtains. It needs to be said, however, that while such
settings are logically possible, they are exceedingly rare, especially when many voters
are involved. Typically, common causes are ubiquitous, and there is little hope that
Classical Independence is preserved after deliberation.
However, deliberation does not necessarily increase voter dependence in the clas-
sical sense. It could decrease dependence by reducing the inuence of certain other
common causes (like room temperature) or direct causal inuences between voters.
It is therefore not always obvious whether deliberation overall increases or decreases
dependence, another reason why the classical CJT literature struggles so much with
deliberation. Our framework, by contrast, avoids this fruitless struggle. We give the
deliberative process its proper place by including it in the description of the problem
, and after having conditionalized on this richly described problem, deliberation
does not threaten independence anymore.
The classical framework leaves one with the unsatisfactory diagnosis that success-
ful deliberation typically increases voter competence on the one hand, but typically
reduces voter independence on the other. Given this unresolved trade-o¤, the overall
e¤ect on group performance could be positive or negative. The diverging claims in
the literature about whether deliberation is benecial demonstrate this all too well.
With our New Theorem, by contrast, we can focus exclusively on how deliberation
a¤ects (New) Competence. In the language of our framework, deliberation is epistem-
ically benecial if it increases the votersproblem-specic competence (that is, shifts
its distribution to the right). If it does, it also raises the probability that a major-
ity is correct. Thus, deliberation should be interpreted as a process that a¤ects the
probability distribution of problem-specic competence, without undermining New
Independence. For illustration, consider our economic advisors one last time. If they
deliberate and exchange evidence or views, they do not thereby threaten New Inde-
pendence (because this deliberation process is part of the problem we conditionalize
on), but they might raise their problem-specic competence, turning di¢ cult into
easier problems. Consequently, a group of deliberating economists may perform bet-
ter because they are more likely to face decisions they tend to get right, while isolated
economists may not.
Our framework has another advantage over the classical one. In its policy recom-
mendation, the classical framework puts all the emphasis on increasing the size of
the electorate, suggesting that this su¢ ces for optimal group performance. Classic-
ally, large groups can be made infallible without increasing individual competence,
just by increasing group size. This loses sight of another important aspect of insti-
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tutional design: the improvement of individual competence. Our framework restores
the picture, showing that individual competence levels matter considerably, since they
determine the upper bound on group performance. Policy measures such as improv-
ing education may raise the upper bound. Put bluntly, not just the size but also the
quality of crowds matters.
6 Conclusion
Condorcets classical jury theorem has an enormous inuence, but its independence
assumption is implausible and is responsible for the overly optimistic asymptotic
conclusion that large groups are infallible. The non-asymptotic conclusion that lar-
ger groups perform better, by contrast, is often plausible, but is in need of a new
justication, grounded on more defensible premises. We have provided such a justi-
cation. Our revised independence assumption does not require independence across
all decision problems but independence given the specic problem. This allows us to
conditionalize on common causes which would otherwise have induced dependence.
This new independence assumption requires a new competence assumption: rather
than assuming voter competence on average over all problems, we assume that the
votersproblem-specic competence is more often high than low. Based on our two
revised premises, our New Jury Theorem retains the classical conclusion that lar-
ger crowds are wiserbut obtains the new asymptotic conclusion that large crowds
are fallible. Specically, the probability of a correct majority vote converges to the
probability that the problem is easy in a technical sense. These conclusions vindic-
ate majoritarian democracy it is worth listening to many rather than few without
being absurdly optimistic about the correctness of democratic decisions. The move
from the classical to our new jury theorem can be summarized in a table:
Classical Jury Theorem New Jury Theorem
Independence premise implausible plausible
Competence premise plausible plausible
Do larger groups perform better? yes yes
Are very large groups infallible? yes no
Our theorem leads to di¤erent policy implications than the classical one with re-
gard to the importance of deliberation and education. The worry that deliberation
threatens voter independence disappears by moving to our new notion of independ-
ence, so that one can focus on the potentially benecial e¤ect of deliberation on voter
competence. The importance of promoting voter competence (through education,
deliberation and other measures) is rehabilitated. Indeed, while the classical model
implies that the level of voter competence is essentially irrelevant since large enough
groups are infallible even if their members are just a little competent our model im-
plies that the performance of large groups strongly depends on voter competence, as
measured by the proportion of decision problems voters nd easy (in our technical
sense). Overall, we believe our ndings give more credibility to epistemic arguments
for democracy based on jury theorems.
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A The causal foundations of New Independence
We here introduce causal network terminology more precisely, and give su¢ cient
conditions on causal interconnections for New Independence, citing a result to be
proved in a more technical follow-up paper. In this appendix, causal relations are
part of the formal setup, and the problem  is not a primitive but is dened as the
complex random variable consisting of all common causes of votes plus the state x
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(if not already a common cause). In this setup, we give a formal justication of
New Independence in the form of a theorem which derives, rather than assumes, New
Independence, based on plausible conditions on the causal relations, which are met
in gures 13 and in many other causal networks.
In a causal network, a variable a is said to be a direct cause of another b (and
b a direct e¤ect of a) if there is an arrow pointing from a to b (a ! b). Further,
a is a cause of b (and b an e¤ect of a) if there is a directed path from a to b, i.e.,
a sequence of variables starting with a and ending with b such that each of these
variables (except from the last one) directly causes the next one. A variable is a
common cause (e¤ect) of some variables if it is a cause (e¤ect) of each of them. A
variable is a private cause of a vote if it is a cause of this vote but of no other votes.
The following can be proved:
Theorem (informally stated). Suppose the votes v1;v2; ::: and the state x are
part of a causal network over these and any number of other random variables, and
suppose probabilities are compatible with these causal relations.18
(a) If no vote is a cause of any other vote, then the votes are independent conditional
on the set C of all common causes of some votes;
(b) If no vote is a cause of any other vote, and the state x is not a common e¤ect
of any votes or private causes thereof19, then the votes are also independent
conditional on the augmented set C [ fxg (i.e., New Independence holds with
the problem identied with this augmented set).
Figure 6: Violations of New Independence.
Many di¤erent causal networks, such as those in gures 13, meet the conditions
laid out in part (b) of the theorem. In such networks the votes are independent
conditional on the problem and New Independence holds. However, some rather
special causal setups violate the conditions of part (b), hence of New Independence.
We give three elementary examples in gure 6. Note that votes have no common
causes in 6b and 6c, and have just x as a common cause in 6a, so that in all three
cases the problem on which we conditionalize consists of x alone. Therefore, New
and Classical Independence here reduce to the same condition, so that the gures
18Compatibility means that any variable is independent of its non-e¤ects conditional on its direct
causes. This requirement is called the Parental Markov Condition.
19 In other words, the state x is not a common e¤ect of variables each of which is or privately causes
a di¤erent vote.
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are in fact counterexamples to both independence conditions. In 6a, vote 1 inuences
vote 2. With such a direct causal connection between the votes independence is
clearly violated. In 6b, the votes cause the state of the world, which is implausible.
Such a network could arise if the state of the world (the correct judgment) was
simply dened as the majority judgment, but this is incompatible with a procedure-
independent notion of correctness as usually assumed in epistemic conceptions of
democracy. Again, independence is violated.20
A more complicated case is displayed in gure 6c. Here the state is the causal
product of two di¤erent private causes of votes. Independence would require that the
votes are independent conditional on the state. But this is not the case, as we can
see by considering the following interpretation of causal network 6c. Suppose state
x represents the fact of whether parties A and B will form a coalition. Suppose, for
simplicity, that A and B will form a coalition if and only if in each party a majority
of members supports forming the coalition. c1 represents the fact of whether there
is enough support in A, c2 of whether there is enough support in B. Voter 1 is an
expert for party A, and bases his prediction entirely on the mood in party A (thus c1s
causal e¤ect on v1), while voter 2 is an expert for party B and bases her prediction
only on the mood in B (thus c2s causal e¤ect on v2). Thus, each voter votes that
the coalition takes place just in case he or she thinks there is enough support in the
party studied. Imagine we know that the state is, say, that the coalition does not
take place. If Independence were true, then voter 1s vote could not tell us anything
about voter 2s vote. But voter 1s vote can tell us something: if voter 1 votes, say,
for the coalition taking place, then voter 2 probably votes the opposite, because voter
1s vote indicates that party A is willing, and hence (since the coalition does not take
place) that party B refuses to coalesce, which voter 2 will know.
The upshot of this discussion is that our New Independence assumption will hold
for most causal setups, but is violated when either there is a direct causal relation
between the votes, or the state is itself commonly caused by votes or private causes
thereof. This is not only a problem for New Independence Classical Independence
is also violated under such circumstances.
B Proof of the New Jury Theorem
Suppose New Independence and New Competence hold. Two preliminary remarks
are due. First, the proof for simplicity assumes that the set of all possible problems,
to be denoted , is countable (with each of its subsets being measurable), and that
every problem  2  occurs with positive probability: Pr() > 0. As a result,
problem-specic competence p ( Pr(Rij)) has a discrete distribution over [0; 1],
supported by a nite set (as in gure 4) or a countably innite set. A proof without
20 If Independence were true, then given that the state is 1 the event of voter 1 voting for 1 would
be independent of the event that all other voters vote for 1. But these two events are negatively
correlated: Pr(v1 = 1jv2 = ::: = vn = 1;x = 1) < Pr(v1 = 1jx = 1). The reason for this inequality is
that the left hand side reduces to Pr(v1 = 1jv2 = ::: = vn = 1) (since the event that v2 = ::: = vn = 1
implies that x = 1), which equals Pr(v1 = 1) (since the votes are independent unconditionally), which
in turn is smaller than Pr(v1 = 1jx = 1) (since the events that v1 = 1 and that x = 1 are positively
correlated because 1s voting for 1 partially explains that x = 1).
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this restriction is available on request; it expresses expectations using integrals instead
of sums and relies on the general statement of New Competence mentioned in footnote
14.
Second, some of the summations used below involve an apparently uncountable
number of terms (as in 
P
p2[0;1] :::). Nonetheless these sums are well-dened because
the number of non-zero terms is always countable (and because if this number is
countably innite then the sum converges to a value that does not depend on the
order of summation).
Fix any group size n in f1; 3; 5; :::g. For any problem  2  consider Pr(Mnj), the
conditional probability that the number of correct votes exceeds n2 given the problem
. Given the problem , this number is the sum of n independent Bernoulli variables
with parameter p (by New Independence and New Competence). Hence this number
follows a Binomial distribution with parameters n and p, that is, takes each value
m in f0; 1; :::; ng with probability n!m!(n m)!(p)n(1  p)n m, and more generally falls
into each set of values S  R with a probability of
Bn;p(S) :=
X
m2f0;1;:::;ng\S
n!
m!(n m)! (p
)m(1  p)n m.
To obtain the probability of a correct majority given , we have to take S =
 
n
2 ; n

:
Pr(Mnj) = Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
.
By averaging over all possible problems, we obtain the unconditional probability that
a majority is correct:
Pr(Mn) =
X
2
Pr(Mnj) Pr() =
X
2
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
Pr().
By partitioning the set of all problems  into subsets of problems with equal voter
competence p 2 [0; 1], the summation P2becomes equivalent to a nested sum-
mation 
P
p2[0;1]
P
2:p=p. Thereby we obtain that
Pr(Mn) =
X
p2[0;1]
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i X
2:p=p
Pr()
=
X
p2[0;1]
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
Pr(p = p).
We split the last expression into a sum S1+S2+S3, where S1, S2 and S3 are dened by
restricting the summation index p to values above, below, or equal to 12 , respectively.
Specically, S1 is given by
S1 =
X
p2( 1
2
;1]
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
Pr(p = p). (1)
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Next, S2 is given by
S2 =
X
p2[0; 1
2
)
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
Pr(p = p)
=
X
p2[0; 1
2
)
n
1 Bn;p
h
0;
n
2
o
Pr(p = p)
=
X
p2[0; 1
2
)
Pr(p = p) 
X
p2[0; 1
2
)
Bn;p
h
0;
n
2

Pr(p = p).
This expression is the di¤erence of (i) a sum which reduces to Pr
 
p < 12

, and (ii)
another sum which (through a change of variable from p to 1 p) can be rewritten asX
p2( 1
2
;1]
Bn;1 p
 
0; n2

Pr(p = 1   p). Here, Bn;1 p
 
0; n2

can in turn be rewritten
as Bn;p
  
n
2 ; n

; the reason is that
Bn;1 p
h
0;
n
2

=
X
m=0;:::;n 1
2
n!
m!(n m)! (1  p)
mpn m and
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
=
X
m=n+1
2
;:::;n
n!
m!(n m)!p
m(1  p)n m,
where the sums appearing on the right hand sides coincide, as is seen from a change
of variable from m to n m. We have thus shown that
S2 = Pr

p <
1
2

 
X
p2( 1
2
;1]
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
Pr(p = 1  p). (2)
Finally, S3 is given by
S3 = Bn; 1
2
n
2
; n
i
Pr(p =
1
2
).
Here, Bn; 1
2
  
n
2 ; n

is, just as B
 
0; n2

, equal to 12 because the binomial distribution
Bn; 1
2
is symmetric around its mean n2 . So,
S3 =
1
2
Pr

p =
1
2

. (3)
By adding the expressions 1, 2 and 3, we obtain that
Pr(Mn) = S1 + S2 + S3 =
X
p2( 1
2
;1]
Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
(p) +  , (4)
where (p) and   are dened as follows:
(p) = Pr(p = p)  Pr(p = 1  p),
  = Pr

p <
1
2

+
1
2
Pr

p =
1
2

.
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Regarding our theorems non-asymptotic conclusion, we have to show that the
expression 4 is increasing in the odd group size n. Since   is a constant in n and
since (p) is a non-negative constant by New Competence, it su¢ ces to show that
for xed p 2  12 ; 1 the binomial probability
Pn := Bn;p
n
2
; n
i
is increasing in (odd) n. This follows from a recursion formula:
Pn+2 = Pn + (2p  1)

n
n+1
2

[p(1  p)]n+12 . (5)
While this recursion formula appears in the literature (e.g., Grofman et. al 1983), we
cannot nd a published derivation; let us therefore mention a simple combinatorial
argument to its e¤ect. We again conditionalize on a given problem  2  and write
p for the corresponding problem-specic competence p. Fix any odd group size n
(2 f1; 3; :::g). Recall that Pn+2 is the (problem-conditional) probability of the event
Mn+2 that more than half of the rst n + 2 votes is correct. This event can be
partitioned into two subevents: the subevent Mn+2nMn that more than half of the
rst n + 2 but fewer than half of the rst n votes are correct, and the subevent
Mn+2 \Mn that more than half of the rst n+2 and also more than half of the rst
n votes are correct. We can therefore decompose Pn+2 into a sum:
Pn+2 = Pr(Mn+2nMnj) + Pr(Mn+2 \Mnj).
Here, the second term can in turn be rewritten as follows:
Pr(Mn+2 \Mnj) = Pr(Mnj)  Pr(MnnMn+2j) = Pn   Pr(MnnMn+2j),
so that in summary
Pn+2 = Pn + Pr(Mn+2nMnj)  Pr(MnnMn+2j). (6)
Now the event Mn+2nMn implies that exactly n+12 of the rst n votes (i.e., a narrow
majority) must be incorrect which happens with probability
 
n
n+1
2

p
n 1
2 (1 p)n+12 
while the next two votes must be correct which happens with probability p2. By
multiplication we therefore obtain that
Pr(Mn+2nMnj) =

n
n+1
2

p
n 1
2 (1  p)n+12 p2
= p

n
n+1
2

[p(1  p)]n+12 . (7)
Similarly, the event MnnMn+2 of a correct majority among the rst n but not among
the rst n + 2 votes implies that exactly n+12 of the rst n votes (i.e., a narrow
majority) is correct which has probability
 
n
n+1
2

p
n+1
2 (1 p)n 12  while the next two
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votes are incorrect which has probability (1  p)2. Thus, again by multiplication,
Pr(MnnMn+2j) =

n
n+1
2

p
n+1
2 (1  p)n 12 (1  p)2
= (1  p)

n
n+1
2

[p(1  p)]n+12 . (8)
Using the expressions 7 and 8, the equation 6 implies the recursion formula 5.
As for the asymptotic conclusion, it su¢ ces to note that as n!1 the binomial
probability Pn converges to one, so that by 4 we have
Pr(Mn) !
X
p2( 1
2
;1]
(p) +  
=
X
p2( 1
2
;1]
Pr(p = p) 
X
p2( 1
2
;1]
Pr(p = 1  p) +  
= Pr

p >
1
2

  Pr

p >
1
2

+  
= Pr

p >
1
2

+
1
2
Pr

p =
1
2

.
This limit is one if Pr
 
p > 12

= 1, and less than one otherwise. 
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